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Abstract
Background: A common challenge for health sector planning and budgeting has been the misalignment between
policies, technical planning and budgetary allocation; and inadequate community involvement in priority setting.
Health system decentralisation has often been promoted to address health sector planning and budgeting challenges
through promoting community participation, accountability, and technical efficiency in resource management. In 2010,
Kenya passed a new constitution that introduced 47 semi-autonomous devolved county governments, and a
substantial transfer of responsibility for healthcare from the central government to these counties.
Methods: This study analysed the effects of this major political decentralization on health sector planning, budgeting
and overall financial management at county level. We used a qualitative, case study design focusing on Kilifi County,
and were guided by a conceptual framework which drew on decentralisation and policy analysis theories. Qualitative
data were collected through document reviews, key informant interviews, and participant and non-participant
observations conducted over an eighteen months’ period.
Results: We found that the implementation of devolution created an opportunity for local level prioritisation and
community involvement in health sector planning and budgeting hence increasing opportunities for equity in local
level resource allocation. However, this opportunity was not harnessed due to accelerated transfer of functions to
counties before county level capacity had been established to undertake the decentralised functions. We also observed
some indication of re-centralisation of financial management from health facility to county level.
Conclusion: We conclude by arguing that, to enhance the benefits of decentralised health systems, resource allocation,
priority setting and financial management functions between central and decentralised units are guided by considerations
around decision space, organisational structure and capacity, and accountability. In acknowledging the political nature of
decentralisation polices, we recommend that health sector policy actors develop a broad understanding of the countries’
political context when designing and implementing technical strategies for health sector decentralisation.
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Background
Health sector planning, budgeting and efficient financial
management are key to ensuring rational prioritization
and use of limited resources, and in responding to com-
munity priorities, broader political interests, and the fidu-
ciary requirements of national bodies and external funders
[1, 2]. However, a major and constant challenge has been
the misalignment between identified sectoral policies,
technical planning and budgetary allocation; and at the
same time ensuring full community involvement and par-
ticipation in the priority setting activities [3–5]. The mis-
alignment between planning and budgeting within the
health sector in many developing countries has often been
as a result of institutionalised separation between these
processes [5]. This problem has resulted in an inability of
the health sector to influence additional resource alloca-
tion in the broader government resource allocation pro-
cesses; and could explain why most developing countries
are constantly unable to achieve their health sector
medium term goals [4, 6].
To address these dual challenges of misalignment be-
tween planning and budgeting, and poor community in-
volvement, health system decentralisation has for many
decades been promoted as a priority reform agenda [7, 8].
Decentralisation involves the transfer of decision making
power and authority over management of public affairs
from a central level of government to sub-national levels. It
has been argued to promote community participation, ac-
countability, and technical efficiency in the management of
public resources [8, 9]. The transfer of power and authority
may involve revenue generation, priority setting, resource
management and/or decision making, and the sub-national
units may be elected directly by the population, or
appointed by the central level or by private entities [7, 10].
These multiple modes of decentralisation make it a very
complex concept to study in a real world setting [8].
The call for health system decentralisation dates back to
the days of the Alma Ata declaration in 1978, which advo-
cated for participation and involvement of communities in
managing their health affairs. At this time, the potential for
decentralisation to enable community empowerment, a
concern for marginalised and disadvantaged communities
to have greater influence over their health services, was in
essence an equity issue [11]. However, decentralisation has
also been critiqued for its potential to allow increasing in-
equities in service provision between more and less wealthy
areas and populations [12]. The publication of the World
Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, in the early
90s [11, 13] also provided renewed momentum for decen-
tralisation, as a ‘good governance’ intervention for improv-
ing technical efficiency in health sector resource allocation
and management, including through improving community
participation to allow resource management decisions to be
made closer to the targeted communities [14, 15].
Empirical findings on the effects of decentralisation on
health sector planning, budgeting and financial manage-
ment have been varied. Decentralization has been linked
with enhanced local level internal health sector resource
mobilization through allowing districts to make local de-
cisions on user fees [16]. The use of both discretional
block grants, and conditional grants as mechanisms for
resource allocation to decentralised units has been re-
ported in many countries [17–21]. Increase in discre-
tional authority over local level health sector priority
setting has been linked with reduced allocations for Pri-
mary Health Care (PHC) in decentralized units in some
counties [17]. It is therefore evident that, despite its
growing popularity as an approach to tackling poor
health system governance, the experiences of health sec-
tor decentralisation in most developing countries have
been varied, irrespective of the form or mode of decen-
tralisation adopted [7, 8]. There is also wider recognition
that, by aiming to transfer power from one set of actors
to another, decentralisation is an inherently highly polit-
ical process whose effects and outcomes are heavily in-
fluenced by contextual factors [14, 22].
The decentralization debate has dominated the polit-
ical arena in Kenya since independence. This has seen
the country adopt several decentralisation policies and
strategies over time [23, 24]. Within the Kenyan health
sector, user fees were introduced in public health facil-
ities in 1989, and District Health Management Teams
(DHMTs) and District Health Management Boards
(DHMBs) were established to oversee management of
these fees [5, 25, 26]. A bottom-up health sector Annual
Planning process was introduced at the same time. In
2009 the MoH introduced the Health Sector Services
Fund (HSSF) which is a system where the government
finances some recurrent costs for primary level health
facilities by sending monies directly from National
Treasury to health facility bank accounts, without going
through the traditional disbursement bureaucracy in the
health system [27]. Most recently, in August 2010,
Kenya adopted a new constitution that created a de-
volved government system with 47 semi-autonomous
counties to be established after the 2013 general elec-
tions. This devolution was largely driven by larger coun-
trywide political processes with a broader goal of
enhancing equitable resource allocation amongst regions
and communities, and public community involvement in
public resource management. The health service delivery
function was among the key services earmarked to be
devolved [28].
The 2010 constitution established four mechanisms
through which counties are resourced: (i.) the Equitable
unconditional share from national government set at a
minimum of 15% of all national government revenue;
(ii.) an Equalisation fund allocated to marginalised
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counties to provide specific social services, set at a mini-
mum of 0.5% of national government revenue; (iii.) Local
revenue generated within the county through county
level taxes; and (iv.) Conditional grants given by national
government to counties to address specific national stra-
tegic priority issues. A Public Finance Management
(PFM) Act elaborates the overall government planning
and budgeting, and financial management process in-
cluding key events and specific time lines at national
and county level (Table S1).
In this paper, we examine the early effects of devolu-
tion in Kenya on health sector planning, budgeting and
financial management. Specifically, we examine the ex-
tent to which devolution addressed the historical chal-
lenges of a mismatch between health sector planning
and budgeting, and inadequate community involvement.
With the growing acknowledgment that decentralisation
effects and outcomes are highly context specific, this
paper provides empirical findings from the Kenyan con-
text. This paper is also unique in reporting on data col-
lected during the early days of decentralisation
implementation rather than in a more stable phase, pro-
viding a deeper understanding of health systems func-
tioning during the process of major political change.
Study methods
This is a qualitative case study focusing on Kilifi County,
but also drawing on data from the broader implementa-
tion of devolution in across the country. Kilifi county
has a population of approximately 1.2 million people
and covers an area of 12,246 km2. About 74% of the
population live on less than one dollar a day [29]. The
decision to use one county was to allow for a deeper ex-
ploration of the issues under focus within the study. To
help in interpreting the findings from Kilifi, we also in-
corporated national level data collection through na-
tional level key informant interviews, and we also drew
from national level and country-wide non-participant
observation of the unfolding events with the implemen-
tation of devolution across the country.
Kilifi County, is one of the six counties that formed the
former Coast Province. The Coastal region of Kenya is
largely believed to have been the originator of the
decentralization debate in Kenya, which championed for a
federal government system at independence [23, 30]. Kilifi
County is also part of the broader health systems govern-
ance learning site, within which this study was nested [31].
Conceptual framework
We adapted a conceptual framework proposed by Bos-
sert and Mitchel (2011) which suggests that decision
space, accountability and organizational capacity often
interact to affect and influence the range of choices
made by decentralised units within decentralised settings
[32]. In our adaptation, we also considered the broader
political context including the mode of decentralisation,
its overall goals and the key actors and players driving
its design and implementation (Fig. 1). For decision
space we considered it as the degree of discretion that
peripheral units have within the law, and their ability to
Decision Space
• What planning, budgeting 
and financial management  
functions are/should be 
decentralised
Organisational capacity
• Hardware elements
• Tangible software elements
• Intangible software elements
Accountability mechanisms
• Ability to demand for 
information from other actors
• Ability to provide information to 
other actors 
• Ability to impose sanctions on 
other actors
• Ability to respond to sanctions 
from other actors
Boarder political context
• Drivers/goals of decentralisation
• Type/form of decentralisation
• Actors – individuals and institutions
Health sector 
planning, budgeting  
and financial 
management 
Fig. 1 Study conceptual framework
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‘bend the law’ [8]. We considered accountability as the
ability of actors to demand from or provide information
to others within the system, and to impose or respond
to sanctions [33]; and we considered organisational cap-
acity around the dimensions of hardware (infrastructure,
technology and finances), tangible software (organisa-
tional systems, management systems, processes and pro-
cedures), and intangible software (communication,
relationships, norms and values, and power), all of which
are necessary for optimal functioning of health system
organisations [34, 35].
We used this framework to inform the development of
our data collection tools and to frame our interpretation
of our study findings and the discussion.
Data collection
We used several qualitative data collection techniques, in-
cluding participant and non-participant observation, regular
reflective practice, document reviews and key informant in-
terviews. Data were collected between December 2012 to
December 2014, just before and during the early days of
implementation of the devolved government systems.
Data collection was facilitated by BT who has a long his-
tory of working with health system managers both in Kilifi
County and at national level. He worked for 3 years as the
district manager of health in Kilifi prior to devolution, and
during 2012 was based fulltime at the national Ministry of
Health (MoH) as a technical adviser to the Technical Plan-
ning Department. During the data collection period for this
study, he was co-opted into the national health sector tech-
nical committee that was charged with designing and facili-
tating the transfer of functions from the national MoH to
the County Departments of Health (CDoH). In Kilifi he
was formerly invited by the county managers to support
the planning process in the county.
BT’s previous experience in the health sector, and his
engagement with the MoH at county and national level
during the data collection phase provided him with a
unique insider perspective, with access to information and
operations of the health system both at national and Kilifi
County level that would not be accessible to purely exter-
nal researcher [36]. To strengthen objectivity in the inter-
pretation of his observations, regular formal reflective
sessions were carried out with the other research team
members to allow for group reflections on the findings.
Field notes were kept in the form of a diary throughout
this period. The observation field notes, and deliberations
from the reflection sessions were triangulated with data
from the key informant interviews and documents reviews
so as to minimize any possible bias from the insider status
Observations and reflective practice
County level observations were carried out as part of a
longer term programme of health system governance
research - a ‘learning site’ - established in Kilifi in 2012
[37]. A health system governance learning site is a geo-
graphic setting where health systems managers and re-
searchers work together over a relatively long period to
identify operational governance challenges and ques-
tions, and to seek solutions and answers to the identified
challenges. Two other learning sites, linked with the
Kilifi one, have been established in Cape Town and Jo-
hannesburg in South Africa [35, 37]. As part of the re-
search activities within the learning site, regular formal
reflective practice sessions are conducted among the re-
searchers, between the researchers and health managers,
and across learning sites. Both BT and SM are part of
the Kilifi learning site, while LG is part of the Cape
Town learning site. National level and country-wide ob-
servations were done by BT through participating in
meetings and activities aimed at facilitating the transfer
of functions from national level MoH to the counties,
and through noting and diarizing key events in the im-
plementation of decentralisation and their subsequent
health sector effects across the country.
Document reviews
The content of all documents relating to the design and
implementation of the devolved government system gen-
erally, and health sector, planning and budgeting more
specifically, was reviewed to provide an understanding of
the overall goals of the devolved government system,
and processes for health sector planning and budgeting
under devolution. These documents included the 2010
constitution, the County Government Act 2012, the
Public Finance Management Act 2012, the Draft Kenya
Health Policy (KHP) 2012–2013, the Kenya Health Sec-
tor Strategic Plan (KHSSP) 2013–2017, the Health Sec-
tor Planning and Budgeting Tools and Guidelines, and
the Draft Kilifi County Integrated Development Plan
(CIDP) 2013–2017.
Semi-structured interviews
We conducted 28 semi-structured interviews in English
with a wide range of purposively selected participants with
a key role in the implementation of devolution at national
level and in Kilifi County. We included those involved in
general as well as health sector planning and budgeting
specifically. These interviews were largely directed by the
data collected through the methods highlighted above, and
were complemented by numerous informal discussions
with key participants throughout the study period, as part
of broader learning site interactions. At national level inter-
view participants were drawn from the national MoH, non-
government health development partners, UN agencies, the
Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution,
the Transition Authority, and the national assembly com-
mittee on health. At the county level, participants were
Tsofa et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2017) 16:151 Page 4 of 12
drawn from the CDoH, County Treasury, County Public
Services Board, County Assembly, and the County Transi-
tion Authority coordination office. All semi-structured in-
terviews were tape recorded and later transcribed verbatim.
Data management and analysis
Interview transcripts, observations and reflective prac-
tice notes were imported into N-Vivo 9 software for
charting and coding. They were later analysed using the
thematic framework approach [38], identifying main
themes guided by our study conceptual framework, and
those emerging from the data.
Study results
In our results, we begin by providing an overview of the
overall country-wide county government structure, and
the planned and actual process of transferring devolved
functions from national to county level. We then elaborate
on how the health sector planning and budgeting process
should in theory work in general across the country, and
what happened in practice in the 2013/14 fiscal year, with
more focus on Kilifi County, and the key country-wide,
and county specific influences on this process that year.
We conclude our findings by highlighting some of the
early outcomes of devolution on health sector financial
management processes in Kenya.
County government structure and transfer of county
functions
The constitution established a county government with
two arms: an executive with an elected County Governor
and Deputy Governor; and a 10-member County Execu-
tive Committee (CEC) appointed by the governor. A le-
gislature known as the County Assembly (CA) was also
established, made up of elected Members of County As-
sembly (MCAs) representing each electoral ward in the
county, and as nominated by political parties in the as-
sembly to represent special groups. The CEC members
have overall policy and political responsibility over each
of the ten County Departments, including health. Within
each department and working under the CEC member is
a Chief Officer, also appointed directly by the governor,
with overall accounting and administrative responsibility
over the respective department [39].
The constitution outlined a seven year process of trans-
ferring functions from national to county governments,
running from August 2010 [28, 40]. However, reacting to
growing pressure from the county governments, the presi-
dent in June 2013 directed that all government functions
to be undertaken in counties be transferred immediately.
This happened at a time when most county governments
had not fully established their structures to undertake
these functions.
County government planning and budgeting under
devolution
The national level planning and budgeting events relevant
to the health sector are outlined in Additional file 1: Table
S1. At the county level, once established, each county gov-
ernment should establish a County Treasury, which facili-
tates and oversees planning and budgeting, and overall
management of public finances. It should establish a con-
solidated County Revenue Account, to hold all county
revenue received from national government or raised lo-
cally. Any withdrawals or payments from this account re-
quire approval from the office of the Comptroller of
Budgets at the National Treasury who is responsible for
ensuring that county governments adhere to government
wide financial regulations. Key county planning and bud-
geting events relevant to the CDoH planning process are
outlined in Additional file 1: Table S2.
All county departments should develop strategic plans,
which are consolidated to form the County Integrated De-
velopment Plan (CIDP). The CIDP consolidation process
should incorporate grassroots public participation, and be
implemented by each county department through Annual
Work Plans (AWPs). Resource allocation to all county de-
partments should occur through an annual resource bid-
ding process, guided by the departmental AWPs. The
county departments then develop departmental budgets,
which are consolidated to form the overall annual county
budget. The CEC member for finance should present
the consolidated county budget to the full CEC for
approval before submitting it to the CA by the end of
April each year. The CA should invite submissions
and inputs from members of the public and other
stakeholders, with budget approval by end of June.
Once approved the county treasury is required by law
to publish and publicize the budget for general public
information.
Figure 2 shows the CDoH planning and budgeting
cycle, showing the key events to be carried out within
the CDoH (green boxes) and how they link with the key
events in the overall county budget process coordinated
by County Treasury (orange circles). The CDoH’s AWP
process should ideally begin in September with a per-
formance review of the previous year’s AWP and an
elaboration of the subsequent year’s priorities. These pri-
orities should guide the CDoH resource bidding process
once the county treasury publishes the County Budget
Review and Outlook Paper which gives a detailed outline
of the projected county resource basket made of alloca-
tions from national government, and locally generated
revenue. It also outlines indicative allocations to county
departments. Within the CDoH, the AWP planning and
budgeting process is overseen by the County Chief
Officer for Health with the County Health Management
Team (CHMT).
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Once they receive the circular providing the overall
guidance, the CDoH is required to develop AWP guide-
lines to facilitate AWP preparation within all its plan-
ning units. The AWP tools should adhere to the
planning and budgeting guidelines released by treasury,
and be aligned with the national health policy and stra-
tegic agenda outlined in the KHP 2012–2030 and
KHSSP 2013–17.
Once all the planning units have undertaken the AWP
planning, the CHMT should convene a meeting with all
health stakeholders including implementing and funding
partners, and the CA Health Committee, to consolidate
the work plans and outline the budget. The consolidated
departmental plans and budget are then submitted to
the County Treasury for incorporation into the draft
county government budget for submission to the full
CEC, and later to the CA for approvals.
Early experiences of county level planning, budgeting
and financial management experiences under devolution;
and their influences
Overview of the 2013/14 planning and budgeting process in
Kilifi
The Kilifi CHMT began the county health strategic plan
development process in early April 2013, but then aban-
doned it until May 2014 because of lack of a Chief Offi-
cer in the CDoH at the time to lead and guide the
process. The CDoH thus did not actively participate in
the overall county budgeting process. The County Treas-
ury went ahead to develop generic budgets for all de-
partments including that for the CDoH, in order to
avoid delaying the county budgeting process which has
legally entrenched timelines. There was thus no sector
AWP developed within the CDoH by the time the over-
all county budget process for 2013/14 was concluded.
The lack of active participation of the CDoH meant that
there was hardly any community or stakeholder involve-
ment in the health sector planning and budgeting process.
However once the consolidated county budget was finalised,
there was an attempt by the County Treasury to subject the
budget to stakeholder and public reviews before it was
finally presented to and debated by the CA for approval.
Influences on the 2013/14 CDoH planning and budgeting
process and outcomes
Delays and tensions in establishing CDoH structures
in Kilifi county A major influence on the planning and
budgeting process in Kilifi specifically was the delays
and tensions in establishing county structures. The na-
tional MoH appointed and seconded interim County
Health Coordinators to every county a few weeks before
the general election in early 2013 with the mandate to
set up interim county health coordination structures.
These county coordinators established interim CHMTs.
In Kilifi, the interim CHMT designated the three former
DHMTs within the county as interim Sub-County
Health Management Teams (SCHMTs) and former Hos-
pital Management Teams (HMTs) for the three referral
hospitals as the interim HMTs. There were however no
clear terms of reference or guidelines provided by na-
tional or county governments for the composition, roles
and mandates of these structures.
County Treasury 
releases  County 
Budget review 
and Outlook 
Paper 
September
Sector Working 
Groups Undertake 
Sector Priority 
Setting
Resource bidding by 
County Departments
December County Treasury 
concludes 
Budgeting
April
County Gov’t 
budget approved by 
CEC and presented 
to County 
Assembly
April - June
Primary Health Facility Planning
Sub-County Planning
County Hospitals Planning
(Government and 
Partners/Donor Resources 
Disclosed)
February - April
Annual CDoH AWP Planning 
Summit (Consolidation and 
Alignment)
May
Annual AWP Review 
September
AWP Implementation
July
County Treasury 
releases County 
Fiscal Strategy 
Paper 
February
Fig. 2 An illustration of the CDoH planning and budgeting cycle
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For more than a year, the governor did not appoint de-
partmental (including health) Chief Officers. This was
largely due to heightened political canvasing within the
county at the time. Only the Chief Officer for Treasury was
appointed in May 2013, as an interim measure to assume
accounting responsibilities for all county departments. For
the CDoH, an earlier appointment had led to tense working
relationships between senior managers which contributed to
the stalling of the CDoH Strategic Plan development process
and the AWP development that had begun in early 2013.
Chief Officers were subsequently appointed in April 2014.
Lack of clarity between CDoH and national MoH
roles country-wide At the time of the 2013/14 health
sector planning and budgeting process, the proposed
process of transfer of functions had not been agreed upon
between national and county governments. The roles the
CDoH would undertake vis a vis the national MoH with
respect to health service provision was therefore not clear.
These observations were also made by some interviewees.
[…. I was lucky enough to participate in the budgeting
process for the county, so and rumour had it that com-
modity, some people were saying that commodity pro-
curement will still be done at the central government. It
wasn’t clear by the time we were doing this year’s
budget. It wasn’t clear…] KII C 004
Lack of capacity of key actors to undertake their
planning and budgeting roles at the county level Be-
yond the structural delays and lack of clarity in roles,
some county level respondents felt that the individuals
and structures tasked with different planning and bud-
geting roles at the county level lacked the basic capacity
to comprehend and undertake these roles:
[…Then again the capacities of the CECs for example
are moving now to developing strategic plans and devel-
oping sector plans, we have had a problem up to now.
We do not have up to today sector plans. Sector Stra-
tegic plans. Even the AWPs, they’re doing work plans…..
…..this is a primary school teacher who was picked from
the classroom and made CEC, and she has no capacity
to develop that and you’re telling them today develop a
strategic plan….] KII C 002
Several interview participants at the County and Sub-
County level also pointed out that the MCAs lacked the
relevant capacity to undertake their oversight roles.
[…The County Assembly for me is a body which has the
will and the power to do things right but has no capacity
to do it, but they have the power, they have the everything,
the will and everything but the capacity is very limited be-
cause if you to have to hold me accountable, you should
be analytical. You should be a person who can understand
things to a certain level…] KII C 002
Because of this lack of capacity of the MCAs, there
was a view that in Kilifi, the county executive could eas-
ily buy their way from the CA if they need any decision
to be made; thus weakening public participation and ac-
countability in governance processes.
[…. You see. So public participation is very weak, very
weak because when you bring a Bill, you bring them
[MCAs] here to take them through … you actually invite
the committee to take them through the Bill. Pay them a
sitting allowance; When they get it there at the assembly,
they will not raise a finger on it….] KII C 002
Early experiences in CDoH financial management
processes in Kilifi County
Re-centralization of financial management roles at county
level
The lack of a Chief Officer for the CDoH for the better
part of 2013 caused significant delays in accessing funds
by the service units, thus hampering service delivery
within Kilifi county. As an interim measure, all financial
requests for routine recurrent expenses by service deliv-
ery and coordination units had to be taken to be ap-
proved by the Chief Officer Treasury, causing significant
delays in financial procedures.
[….right now as Kilifi the only challenge we have is the
fact we don’t have a chief officer ….,… then these people
have to come all the way from Malindi, and Mariakani;
the Malindi [Sub-Counties] ones are …they have to
come here, you know…] KII C 002
[…We took the voucher since before Christmas, to the
county treasury, around December, (this interview was
in March of subsequent year)…..yes they have not been
able to pay the vouchers. So petrol also the same. We
have to go and kneel down there before the supplier we
cry if there is no phone and imagine if you don’t have
even recurrent money even to buy airtime, it means you
have to go physically if you miss him you have to borrow
airtime again so we are just running in debts…] KII SC
005 However even after the appointment of the Chief
Officer Health in April 2014, the delegation and transfer
of financial management responsibilities for recurrent
activities at Sub-County, Hospitals and PHC facilities
did not happen. Sub-county and health facility managers
still have to travel long distances to the County head-
quarters to get approvals and financing for their recur-
rent expenses serviced by the CDoH Chief Officer.
User fee lock-down in hospitals within the county
Given the challenges and delays in accessing county level
funds for service delivery by the hospitals, the user fees
(which the hospitals continued to collect after devolu-
tion) were a potential alternative source of funds for
these facilities. However, once the County Treasury was
established in Kilifi, it directed that the user fees fell
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under what is collectively described as ‘County Revenue’
and thus the hospitals should close their respective user
fees bank accounts and be banking the money in the
County Consolidated Revenue Account.
The CDoH was not happy with this directive, and for a
whole year the hospitals continued to collect the money
and bank it in the hospitals’ accounts, but could not spend
it because of lack of authority to spend from the county
treasury; even with the existing acute and emergency fi-
nancial needs in these hospitals at the time.
[…We are banking 100% according to the policy and…
Several millions like here I think it’s more than 30 million
is inside there, frozen; and yet we have the ambulance…
that cannot be removed from the fundi (mechanic), im-
agine……] KII SC 005
The delays in accessing funds for addressing emer-
gency needs from the county treasury and the stand-off
over the use of the user fees funds, led some hospital
managers to decide to spend the money they collected
from user fees, without banking them, so as to address
their emergency needs without seeking approvals.
[…now sometimes (XXX hospital) has been forced to
spend money at source [without banking it] as I speak
now they have spent almost 500,000 shillings at source.
Yeah because how do you survive, we don’t have water,
we don’t have electricity you have no supplies, patients
don’t have food and you have debt of around 2 million
just for food alone, and such kind of things we are talk-
ing about.…] KII SC 007
Access to HSSF funds for PHC facilities Prior to devo-
lution, an additional source of funds to support service
delivery particularly for primary health facilities across
the country was the HSSF. As noted above, these were
funds put together as a contribution by national govern-
ment and two main donor agencies, DANIDA and the
WB that would be sent into PHC facilities directly from
central level treasury to cater for recurrent expenses
[27]. However, in the early days of devolution, there
were contestations over the roles of national and county
government in the management of these funds. County
governments wanted to undertake the selection and gazet-
tement of the Facility Management Committees comprising
of local community representatives and who were key in
the management of these funds at the facility level, arguing
that managing PHC facilities fell within their mandate.
Another contention was regarding the channel and
flow of HSSF funds. The national MoH wanted the flow
to remain as prior to devolution, i.e. move directly from
national treasury to facility bank accounts. This position
was supported by the WB. The county governments
however wanted the funds to flow through the County
Treasury, a position supported by DANIDA. These con-
testations were also recounted by some interviewees.
[…am hearing that there is still a tug of war between
the county and national government. The county wants
to gazette, to do the gazettement because they claim this
is a county function. The national government also
wants to do that…] KII SC 02
These contestations led to a significant delay in the re-
lease of funds. Ultimately when an agreement was
reached for counties to gazette the FMCs but for the
funds to go straight into facility accounts, DANIDA dis-
agreed and withheld their contribution into the HSSF
kitty, leading to a significant reduction of the total
amount of funds sent directly to health facilities.
Discussion
The design and model of the devolved government struc-
ture introduced in Kenya under the 2010 constitution cre-
ated opportunities for a major increase of decision space
over public resource management from national level to
the county level. In addition, the devolution laws created
an elaborate mechanism to increase direct and in-direct
(through elected representatives) community involvement
in planning and budgeting. However, these opportunities
did not improve the historical challenges of poor align-
ment of health sector planning and budgeting processes,
and poor community involvement, at least during the
early days of implementation of devolution in Kilifi
County. This was largely due to a lack of clarity in roles
between the national MoH and the CDoHs country-wide,
delays in setting up the county level structures required to
facilitate the processes, and lack of the required organisa-
tional and individual capacity at county level to undertake
the planning and budgeting function. All of this took place
in a context of country-wide rushed transfer of functions
from national to county level, in turn linked to broader
political contestations in the country. In addition, the early
days of decentralizing witnessed perverse re-centralisation
of operational financial management processes at county
level, and disruption of traditional operational financial
flows to hospitals and PHC facilities.
From our findings, it is evident that within a decentra-
lised setting, discretion over planning, budgeting and fi-
nancial management often interact with organisational
capacity, and accountability mechanisms, to affect health
sector planning and financial management outcomes.
These observations are largely in line with those of Bos-
sert and Mitchell (2011) [32]. However, in addition, our
findings suggest that this interaction and associated out-
comes need to be viewed within the broader political
context in which the decentralisation model was de-
signed and implemented.
From applying our adapted conceptual framework, we
see that the structure and implementation process of de-
centralisation laws and policies in Kenya has always been
influenced and informed by the country’s political history
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and culture [41]. Key features of this history include the
political heritage of the main political parties and key pol-
itical actors in the country over time, the perceived injus-
tices and inequalities across different tribal and
geographical populations, and the experience of political
violence especially after the 2007 general election [42, 43].
This partly explains the political push and demand to rap-
idly transfer functions to counties in 2013 even before
counties had appropriate structures to undertake these
functions. Notably though, is that the health sector has
traditionally not been involved in the design of decentral-
isation initiatives, but rather left to play “catch-up”
through adapting to broader changes [24].
In analysing the capacity of the Kilifi CDoH, we find
that during the early implementation of devolution the
CDoH inherited the existing hardware elements including
physical infrastructure for delivering health services and a
good financial resource allocation from the County Treas-
ury in 2013/14. However, during that year, the depart-
ment’s tangible and intangible software elements were
significantly lacking. There was no clear organisational
structure with clear mandates and roles for different ac-
tors, and the existing managers lacked the knowledge and
skills required for the strategic planning and budgeting
roles. In addition, by the time of the 2013/14 fiscal year re-
source bidding process at the county level, the CDoH did
not have a sector strategic plan and an AWP, both of
which are essential tangible software elements required to
influence and facilitate the resource bidding at county
level. In terms of intangible software, we find that the
CDoH lacked the necessary power, appropriate relation-
ships and communication capacity to influence the deci-
sion by the county treasury to direct that hospital to close
their individual user fee bank accounts and deposit all user
fee funds into the county consolidated revenue account.
Barasa et al. (2016) reported that hospital user fees are the
single most important source of readily available financial
resources for addressing many recurrent and often emer-
gency needs within Kenyan county hospitals [44, 45]. The
loss of this source of revenue coupled with the perverse
re-centralisation of financial management processes
meant that the hospitals could not address their emer-
gency recurrent needs appropriately. Our findings support
Omar’s (2002) assertion that health system decentralisa-
tion always brings additional responsibilities including of
planning and resource allocation to local decision makers,
yet their capacity for undertaking these responsibilities is
often lacking, and often ignored during the design and im-
plementation of decentralised systems [22].
From our findings we see that, during the county plan-
ning and budgeting process, the different county depart-
ments, including the CDoH are supposed to use their
annual priorities as indicated in their AWPs to compete for
the county revenue in a bidding process that is coordinated
by the county treasury [46]. However, we see that during
the 2013/14 fiscal year the Kilifi CDoH did not participate
in the resource bidding process at the county level. This
forced the county treasury to allocate the CDoH resources
based on a generic budget. As highlighted above, the
reasons for the CDoH non-participation in the resource
bidding process were lack of significant tangible software
capacity elements including lack of a clear organisational
structure, failure to appoint key offices to drive the depart-
ment’s budgeting process, and lack of a departmental
strategic plan and AWP to guide the annual sector prior-
ities. This lack of appropriate capacity reduced the CDoH’s
ability to influence the amount of resources allocated to the
health sector, thus reducing its decision space over resource
allocation [4].
In line with the spirit of decentralisation within the
2010 constitution, county departments are mandated to
further decentralise decision making particularly of plan-
ning, budgeting, and financial management related to day-
to-day service delivery to sub-county management entities
[39]. The lack of appropriate structure within the CDoH
meant that the department could not further decentralise
its coordination and operational financial management
roles to sub-county units including the hospital and sub-
county management units. Subsequently all the hospital
and sub-county management teams had to send in all of
their requests for any purchases and expenditures to the
Chief Officer at the county headquarters, causing a signifi-
cant delay in implementation of planned activities. This
happened even though before the implementation of
county governments, district and hospital management
units had a delegated accounting mandate and managed
their local budgets for operational recurrent expenditures
[5, 25, 26]. It thus can be argued that the implementation
of devolution reversed historical gains of health sector fi-
nancial management processes at the peripheral units at
least in the short term.
In general, our findings highlight the necessity for proper
and appropriate structures and capacity at peripheral level
in decentralised health systems, if they are to succeed in
taking up the functions mandated to them. This finding
present an essential contribution into the existing literature
which has been largely silent in reporting on local level cap-
acity while highlighting health sector decentralisation out-
comes [7, 32].
In addition to enhancement of technical efficiency, one of
the most common reasons for the promotion of public sec-
tor decentralisation is the belief that it enhances account-
ability largely through supporting community participation
in decision making [10]. In analysing the accountability
structures and practices at the county level, we see that the
CA, composed of elected MCAs, is the main organ that of-
fers financial and political accountability oversight of the
broader county government [39]. The devolution laws also
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created and mechanism for direct public participation in
the county level planning and budgeting process. From our
results, we see that though there was an attempt to invite
public views and comments when the overall county
budget had been finalised, there was no public involvement
at the health sector level as the health sector planning
structures had not been established, hence the process did
not happen as expected. In addition, our findings reveal
lack of appropriate knowledge and skills among the MCAs
meant that they we unable to appropriately carry out their
accountability function. This highlights the important inter-
actions between accountability mechanisms and organisa-
tional capacity, and agrees with the observations of Bossert
and Mitchel (2011) [32].
The national government, due to political pressure was
forced by the county governments to decentralise all county
the functions immediately even though the law provided for
up-to three years for the transfer of functions to be under-
taken. This example highlights that, the national govern-
ment had less software tangible elements of ‘power’ over the
county governments in influencing the process of transfer of
functions. Subsequently because of the counties exuded
more political power, they were able to expand their deci-
sion space over the transfer of county functions process.
Study strengthens and limitations
The embedded nature of this study, owing to BT’s ‘insider’
position both at the national MoH and Kilifi County
levels, and the nesting of the study within the Kenyan
learning site, facilitated access to individuals and in-depth
learning, and enhanced the opportunity for the study find-
ings to be regularly shared with relevant decision makers.
A key limitation was the collection of data during the
early days of devolution implementation. This meant
that many of the effects were still unfolding. The find-
ings therefore only relate to the early health system ex-
periences of devolution in Kenya. However, the changes
observed during these early days of devolution point to
important issues that may persist into the medium and
possibly even longer term in the absence of further
intervention. An example is the recentralisation of finan-
cial management control. In addition, the study findings
are important because understanding the effects on and
functioning of the health system during such radical
change has important lessons for other countries plan-
ning devolution or other large scale change. It would be
naïve to consider that health systems are ever static – in
fact they are usually undergoing some form of change,
albeit less dramatic than Kenyan devolution [47].
The primary focus on one county experiences could also
be viewed as a limitation of the study. However, the deci-
sion to use one county was deliberate, as it allowed for a
deeper exploration of the issues under focus within the
study, by involving a broad range of stakeholders. Similar
findings on the influences on the county level experiences
in Kilifi, like the effect by rushed transfer of function, de-
lays in setting up county level structures and low capacity
of county level stakeholders in undertaking their man-
dates, have also been reported in other counties [48, 49].
In addition, data collection for this study was also done at
a national level through interviews and observations, and
this allowed for drawing on country-wide lessons in inter-
preting the findings from Kilifi county.
Study conclusions and recommendations
The findings from this study show the relevance and value
of our conceptual framework. The framework also offers
highlights key issues that should be addressed when de-
signing and implementing decentralization processes.
For Kenya, we recommend interventions to progressively
improve county level capacity for health sector planning,
budgeting and financial management, and the functioning
of county level community involvement and accountability
structures. We argue that if the county level capacity is im-
proved, then the opportunities created by devolution for
improving county level health sector planning and budget-
ing and community involvement will be harnessed. An ex-
ample of capacity enhancing strategy could include
integrating policy evaluation research during times of major
health sector policy implementation. This would enhance
the ability of providing real-time understanding of the pol-
icy implementation effects and provide a feed-back mech-
anism for enhancing policy implementation.
From this study for example, when we shared our pre-
liminary findings with the different actors at county level,
concerned actors came together to start deliberations of
developing county level legislation, dubbed The Kilifi
County Facility Improvement Fund Bill. This bill - which
is currently before the county assembly - will allow the
CDoH to collect and retain user fees in hospitals and util-
ise them for improving their health facilities. In addition,
from our continued interaction with the Kilifi CDoH
within the Kilifi learning site, there was an observed better
participation of the CDoH in the planning and budgeting
process in the 2014/15 fiscal year, which also had more
community involvement from facility level. However,
whether the final 2014/15 CDoH budget was more aligned
with the sector specific priorities is yet to be established
The Kenyan experience reported here reminds policy-
makers in other settings of the importance of establish-
ing, as integral to a decentralisation strategy, clear and
distinct roles between the centre and the periphery. The
experience also shows the importance of building the
knowledge and skills among the different actors. Finally,
it emphasises the need for health sector policy actors to
be aware of the broader political context when designing
and implementing technical strategies for health sector
decentralisation.
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